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Abstract 
Bidding strategy in online auctions, as a sort of strategic behavior, can help bidders to get what they 
want more efficiently and effectively. It receives much attention in many researches. However, the 
determinants of bidding strategy adoption still remain unclear. In this study, we investigate the role of 
social network in bidding strategy adoption using real transaction data from an online P2P lending 
market. The analyses reveal that 1) bidding strategy tends to be homogeneous in different online 
social networks. 2) Joining an online social network does not change the bidding strategy adoption 
behavior significantly. 3) The size of social network will affect bidding strategy adoption and smaller 
ones are more homogeneous than bigger ones. 4) In a social network, bidders with different roles have 
different preferences on bidding strategies. Our findings can be considered as important empirical 
evidences for theories about social influence and human behavior. 
Keywords: social network, bidding strategy, online auction, P2P lending market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Bidding strategy, as a sort of strategic bidding behaviour, can help bidders to get what they want more 
efficiently and effectively. For example, in eBay, cross-bidding strategy is effective in lowering cost 
of purchase (Kayhan et al. 2010; Anwar et al. 2006). More importantly, dominant strategy might exist 
in some types of auctions, like Vickrey (1961) demonstrates that bidding average, rather than 
revealing bidders’ true valuation, is a dominant strategy in second-price sealed-bid auction. It seems 
that adopting bidding strategy can bring bidders great benefit. We notice that plenty of researchers are 
devoted to the bidding strategy itself and identify various bidding strategies in real-life auctions (e.g. 
Shah et al. 2003; Bapna 2004). However, the determinants of bidding strategy adoption are still 
unclear. Theories in sociology and organization suggest that we consider the impact of group on 
individuals’ behaviours (Foxall et al. 1998; Tirole 1996; Cialdini 1993). Particularly, with the 
uncertainty of online P2P lending auction, involved parties tend to look for others’ behaviours as the 
guides (Tesser et al. 1983). Furthermore, studies on information diffusion have proved that 
information flows are geographically localized (Jaffe et al. 1993) and particularly strong in 
interpersonal network (Singh 2005). In this paper, we are going to explore the role of social network in 
bidding strategy adoption in online auctions which has been ignored by many relevant studies (Puro et 
al. 2011; Bapna et al. 2004; Shah et al. 2003; Roth & Ockenfels  2002). 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Social Influence and Human Behaviour 
People usually think that social influence needs “face to face” interaction as a premise in order to 
affect human behaviour. However, Marsden and Friedkin (1993) point out that social influence does 
not require such kind of direct interaction. The preconditions are that the information is obtainable and 
behaviour is observable. Thus, in online activities, though without direct interactions, social influence 
still has a chance to affect human behaviour. In online digital auctions, Dholakia and Soltysinski (2001) 
find that many buyers tend to bid for things with more existing bids. The word-of-mouth represented 
in different forms, like online conversations (Godes & Mayzlin 2004) and online reviews (Chevalier & 
Mayzlin 2006), shows impacts on product sales. In the research stream about social influence and 
human behaviour, we argue that introducing the dimension of social network would broaden the 
research domain. Firstly, we focus on how the attributes of social network affect human behaviour 
diffusion. Social network structure refers to the way that how individuals are connected. It will 
critically affect the extent to which a behaviour pattern diffuses across a population (e.g., Granovetter 
1973). Leskovec et al. (2007) find that network structure is central to viral marketing. Watts and 
Strogatz (1998) find that the structure of "small-world" network makes diffusion (e.g., infection of 
diseases) become more faster than otherwise. Centola (2010) compares clustered networks and small-
world networks and find that clustered networks are more helpful in adoption of people's behaviour 
because the behavioural adoption is different from infection of diseases and requires reinforcement 
from multiple sources. Social embeddedness is another important factor that needs to be taken into 
account in investigating social network and human behaviour adoption. Also, social embeddedness 
describes the degree to which individuals or firms are enmeshed in a social network (Granovetter 
1985). Organizational researchers find that social embeddedness is highly relevant to organizational 
behaviour (Uzzi 1996).  
Interaction Breeds Similarity and Similarity Breeds Interaction 
Interaction between organizations breeds behaviour similarity. It is interesting to see that frequent 
communication between two organizations will lead to similar evaluation of strategic issues 
(Galaskiewicz & Burt 1991). Brass et al. (1998) suggests that organizations compare themselves with, 
and adopt similar attitudes and behaviours of, those others who occupy equivalent positions in the 
network. Since, firms’ top decision-makers "know one another, see one another socially and at 
business, and so, in making decisions, take one another into account” (Mills 1956). This phenomenon 
also implies possibility for sharing important information among those top decision-makers, which 
lead to similarity in organizational behaviour (Homans 1961). Within a social network, members 
would have more channels and lower cost to communicate with each other. They would exhibit more 
homogeneity in bidding strategy adoption. On the other side, homophily principle also implies higher 
homogeneity within social network. McPherson et al. (2001) also find that people who are friends 
often exhibit a great deal of similarity in attitudes and behaviours. This is called the homophily in 
social networks (McPherson et al. 2001) and which is resulted by both social selection and social 
influence processes (Cohen 1977; Kandel 1978). Blau (1977) states the influence between similarity 
and interaction is bilateral: interaction breeds similarity and similarity breeds interaction. Building on 
existing literatures, we assume such kind of information (bidding strategy) exchange activities might 
also happen in online social network. The principle of homophily has great implication for many 
aspects of human behaviour, like attitudes they form, information they receive, and interactions they 
experience.  
HYPOTHESIS 1. Bidding strategy adoption in online social networks tends to be homogeneous to a 
certain degree. 
Information Diffusion in Social Network 
Information for bidding strategy: good or bad, effective or ineffective, how to apply it and etc., are 
crucial for a bidder in a competitive and uncertain environment. Social relationship may help bidder to 
get useful information to make decision (Granovetter 1973; Allen 1977) and an individual tends to 
rely on information coming from his/her social network (Merton 1968; Boudon 1986; Brown 1988), 
especially in uncertain, novel, or otherwise ambiguous choice situations (e.g. Sherif 1936; Sandell 
1999). Abrahamson and Rosenkopf (2012) review theories, build model to explain how social 
networks channel information about innovations to potential adopters. Besides that, the circulation of 
information in social network has its own characteristics which would deepen our understanding of 
human behaviour in social network. Ferrary (2003) point out that in a social network, information 
about its members circulates very quickly which might create the information asymmetry between 
members and non-members of the social network. This inspires us to expect that if someone is very 
successful in auctions by using bidding strategy, then the one within the same social network would 
aware this more easily and quickly than non-members. Beyond hypothesis 1, we explore the difference 
in distributions of bidding strategy at market level. Also, one of important properties of social network 
is its influence on diffusion of technology, opinions and behaviours (Jackson 2009). So, if social 
network really facilitate the diffusion of certain bidding strategy, we should observe significant 
difference in bidding strategy distributions between bidders with and without joining a social network. 
Then beyond hypothesis 1, we explore the differences in the distribution of bidding strategy at market 
level. 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The strategy distributions of bidders within and without a social network should be 
significantly different. 
Social Network Size and Homogeneity 
Furthermore, in social network theory, homophily in social network (McPherson et al. 2001) should be 
mediated by network size. Social network theory indicates that keeping all else equal, larger social 
networks are usually accompanied by lower ability to crystallize and enforce norms (Granovetter 
2005). One implication of this statement is that the size of social network will affect bidding strategy 
adoption. 
HYPOTHESIS 3. Smaller size social network is more likely to be homogeneous in bidding strategy 
adoption. 
Social Network Member Role and Behaviour 
In Prosper.com, a group leader has the full control over the group, including the daily maintenance, 
inviting new members, screening join requests, helping members to get loan and etc. A group leader 
has the most access to each member of a group, which means a group leader often has the best position 
in information circulation within a social network. Another crucial task of the group leader is to serve 
as a bridge between groups (Burt 2000, p. 360), thereby serving as a conduit to useful information and 
knowledge located outside the group (e.g., Kotter 1999; Whyte 1943/1993). Building on those 
statements, we have a hypothesis on the relationship between the role of a bidder and bidding strategy 
adoption behaviour. 
HYPOTHESIS 4. Bidders with different roles in a social network should exhibit different preferences 
on bidding strategy adoption. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To evaluate the impact of social network on bidding strategy adoption, at least, we should confirm that 
social network and bidding strategy are identifiable in our dataset firstly. In this section, at the very 
beginning, a brief introduction about how Prosper.com works is given. After that, we define bidding 
strategy with available parameters and identify online social network in Prosper. Particularly, Gini 
Index will be used to measure the degree of homogeneity of bidding strategy adoption. 
3.1 Overview of Prosper 
Propsper.com is one of the largest and earliest online P2P lending market in the world. Prosper 
matches people who need small loans, but can't get them from traditional loan markets mainly hosted 
by banks and other financial institutions, with willing lenders, and let them communicate directly. The 
pricing model utilized by Prosper is a multi-unit reverse auction. We downloaded the data used to 
explore bidding behaviour from Prosper.com on 02/02/2009. The dataset contains listings and all the 
bids for each listing. The creation date of listings ranges from 11/2005 to 02/2009. The original dataset 
contained 925,130 listings and 6,550,387 bids. However, parts of the listings are heavily contaminated 
by noisy data and missing values. We removed observations with missing and abnormal values. For 
our final clean dataset, the number of listings is 14,958 and the total number of bids for those listings 
is 133,760. 
3.2 Strategy Identification 
Research on bidding strategy, has accumulated ample evidences on strategic bidding behaviour 
patterns. In Table 1, we summarize identified strategies from previous studies for online auctions. 
 
Literature Market Strategy 
Puro et al. (2011) Prosper.com sniping, late bidding, opportunist, evaluator, portfolio 
bidding, multi-bid strategies(all late), multi-bid 
strategies(all skeptic), multi-bid strategies(last bid 
late), multi-bid strategies(stepped bidding), unknown 
Bapna et al. (2004) eBay.com early evaluators, middle evaluators, opportunists, sip-
and-dipper and participator 
Shah et al. (2003) eBay.com late-bidding (sniping), evaluators, multiple-bid 
(skeptic and unmasking) 
Anwar et al. (2006) eBay.com Cross-bidding 
Table 1. Identified strategies in online auctions 
Each strategy has its own content. Table 2 summarizes those for a clear view. 
 
Strategy Content 
Sniping Single bid, an extreme case of late bidding strategy (Puro et al. 2011) 
Late bidding Single bid, entry when time close to auction end (Shah et al. 2003) 
Opportunist The late bidding strategy is also called opportunists and has a higher 
likelihood of winning (Bapna et al. 2004). 
Made their bids with minimal excess decrements, risk-averse, favor less 
risky listings (Puro et al. 2011) 
Evaluator Bid once, early, and at a high value, usually significantly greater than the 
minimum required bid at that time (Shah et al. 2003) 
Evaluators minimize the time cost of monitoring auctions, may pay more 
than other winners but gain a risk-aversion premium (Bapna et al. 2004) 
Portfolio Bids are made during the very first seconds of the listing, or bids are made 
in the same auction at exactly the same second (Puro et al. 2011) 
Sip-and-dipper No descriptive characteristics, several statistical indicators are used to define 
it, but has a higher likelihood of winning (Bapna et al. 2004) 
Participator Significantly value their time, never bid more than the minimum 
requirement (Bapna et al. 2004) 
Multi-bid strategies  
(all late) 
Number of bids >1, all bids are made within 12 hours before auction end 
(Puro et al. 2011) 
Multi-bid strategies  
(all skeptic) 
Number of bids >1, all of which have zero excess increment (Shah et al. 
2003) 
Multi-bid strategies 
(last bid late) 
Number of bids >1, only last bid is made within 12 hours before auction end 
(Puro et al. 2011) 
Multi-bid strategies Bids made within 5 min of each other, max excess decrement> 0.3 pp, last 
bid is made within 24 hours before auction end (Puro et al. 2011) 
(stepped bidding) Bidder simultaneously monitors several identical auctions, taking advantage 
of their price differential (Kayhan et al. 2010) 
Cross-bidding Single bid, an extreme case of late bidding strategy (Puro et al. 2011) 
Table 2. Strategy content 
The parameters used to define strategies are listed in Table 3. 
 
Parameters Puro et al. (2011) Bapna et al. (2004) Shah et al. (2003) 
Number of bids 
made in one auction 
yes yes Yes 
Excess 
decrement/increment 
yes no Yes 
Time of entry yes yes Yes 
Time of exit no yes No 
Bid amount no Not available in eBay Not available in eBay 
Table 3.          Parameters used to define strategy 
In table 4, several examples are given to demonstrate the diversity of definitions for bidding strategies 
employed by different studies. 
 
Literature Snipping Late bidding Opportunist Evaluator 
Puro et al. (2011) 
Entry when time 
left≤30 min 
Entry when time 
left >30 min & ≤12 h 
Excess decrement≤0.3 
percentage 
points & time left>30 min 
Excess decrement≥1.0 pp 
& Time left≥1 day 
Or Excess decrement≥1.0 
pp & Time left≥1 day 
Bapna et al. (2004) 
Not available Not available 
Mean of number of bids=2.45 & 
mean of time of first bid=1.22 & 
mean of time of last bid=8.02 
Mean of number of 
bids=1.24 & mean of 
time of first bid=1.99 & 
mean of time of last 
bid=2.53 
Shah et al. (2003) Entry at closing 
seconds 
Entry when time close 
to acution end 
Not available 
bid once, early, and at a 
high value  
Roth & Ockenfels 
(2002) 
Entry when time 
left≤1 min 
Not available Not available Not available 
Table 4.          A comparison of definitions for several common strategies 
According to previous studies, we define bidding strategies in a hierarchical for the first time and 
demonstrate them in Figure 1. 
Level 2Level 1
Bidding Strategy
Multi Bid
(Bid count>1 per 
listing)
Single Bid
(Bid count=1 per 
listing)
Late Single
(Time left<=30%)
Early Single
(Time left>=70%)
Evaluator
(Excess decrement 
lower than median)
Paticipator
(Always bid at  zero 
increment)
All Late
(For all bids, time 
left<=30%)
All Skeptic
(For all bids, excess 
decrement=0)
 
Figure 1. Strategy Definition 
Some of the strategy definitions are derived from non-multi-unit auction environments. They need to 
be modified in multi-unit auction. Since, in multi-unit auction, bid lower or higher than previous bids 
both have chances to win. In Figure 1, excess decrement/increment is calculated as the difference 
between current bid interest rate and lowest previous bid interest. If negative, it means current bid 
interest rate is lower than previous lowest bid interest rates, which is defined as excess decrement. If 
positive, it means current bid interest rate is higher than previous lowest bid interest rates, which is 
defined as excess increment. The definitions of evaluator and opportunist are based on excess 
decrement and excess increment separately. Here we give the quantile for excess decrement and 
excess increment of all the bids in our dataset. 
 
Quantile Decrement Increment 
100% Max -0.0001 0.4500 
99% -0.0005 0.1200 
95% -0.0020 0.0688 
90% -0.0040 0.0500 
75% Q3 -0.0095 0.0299 
50% Median -0.0125 0.0145 
25% Q1 -0.0247 0.0056 
10% -0.0400 0.0020 
5% -0.0534 0.0010 
1% -0.1000 0.0002 
0% Min -0.2600 0.0001 
Table 5.         Quantile for Excess Decrement and Increment 
3.3 Social Network Identification 
In our dataset, we have identified 181 online social networks in Prosper. The summary statistics are 
listed in Table 6. 
 
Statistics Value 
Number of Social Networks 181 
Mean 9 
Median 4 
Lowest Value 2 
Highest Value 140 
Std. Deviation 15.51 
Table 6.          Summary statistics for the size of online social network 
From Table 6, we can see that the average social network size is 9 (member). The median size is 4 
which indicate that 50% of the social networks are smaller than 4. In Prosper, the largest social 
network has 140 members while the smallest one only contains 2 persons (social networks only 
contain 1 person have be excluded from our analysis). 
3.4 Homogeneity Measurement 
Measuring the impurity of strategy adoption is crucial to verify proposed hypotheses. In this study, 
Gini Index is employed to measure the impurity of strategy adoption in each online social network. 
 
GINI(i) = 1 − ∑[𝑝(𝑗|𝑖)]2
𝑗
    (1) 
For social network 𝑖 , 𝑗  is the number of persons who adopted strategy 𝑗 . There are two extreme 
conditions, one is Gini=0, it indicates that, in an online social network only one bidding strategy is 
adopted. The other is Gini=1, it means that each bidding strategy is equally adopted by the members of 
this social network. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We calculate the Gini Index for each social network and get a distribution of it. In order to investigate 
hypothesis 1, we need to see the dynamic change of Gini distribution with time. At strategy level 1 and 
2, we calculate Gini and use ANOVA to analyse its change and get Figure 2.  
Level l Level 2
 
Figure 2. Box Plot for Gini Distributions of Level 1 and 2 Strategies by Years 
In Figure 2, we can see the mean of Gini distribution is decreasing year by year. The F statistics are 
4.81 and 3.33 and their corresponding p-values are less 0.05. It indicates that the mean of Gini is 
significantly different for different years and the adoption of bidding strategy tend to be homogeneous. 
Hypothesis 1 states that bidding strategy in online social networks tends to be homogeneous to a 
certain degree. We demonstrate the change of Gini distribution with time in Figure 2 and see a 
decreasing trend of it at strategy level 1 and 2. Thus, the result presented in Figure 2 shows strong 
support for hypothesis 1.  
Further than Figure 2, we also identify that more and more social networks are converging to single 
bid strategy (level 1) and late bid strategy (level 2). Within a social network, if one strategy is more 
popular than the others, we regard it as a dominant strategy in this social network. By counting the 
number of social networks for each dominant strategy at level 1 and 2, we have Table 7 and 8.  
 
Year Dominant Strategy # of Social Network Percent(%) 
2006 Multi Bid 4 3.57 
2006 Single Bid 108 96.43 
2007 Single Bid 126 100 
2008 Single Bid 48 100 
Table 7.          Dominant strategy and the number of social network (level 1 strategies) 
Year Dominant Strategy # of Social Network Percent(%) 
2006 All Late 3 2.91 
2006 All Skeptic 1 0.97 
2006 Early Bid 23 22.33 
2006 Late Bid 79 76.70 
2007 Early Bid 16 12.70 
2007 Late Bid 110 87.30 
2008 Early Bid 3 6.25 
2008 Late Bid 45 93.75 
Table 8.          Dominant strategy and the number of social network (level 2 strategies) 
To avoid winner's curse (Thaler 1988), auction sites (e.g., Prosper and eBay) suggest bidders to bid 
only once with their own evaluations. Obviously, most of the bidders adopt such suggestion. 
Converging to single bid strategy and bid late that can be considered as evidence of market evolution 
toward maturity. In hypothesis 2, we want to explore the impact of one kind of social connection — 
joining a social network — on bidding strategy adoption. 
 
Figure 3. A Comparison for Strategy Distributions with and Without Joining a Social Network 
In Figure 3, we cannot identify any significant difference in two pie charts. At least, we can conclude 
that, at market level, whether joining a social network or not do not show any significant difference in 
bidding strategy distribution. 
Hypothesis 2 postulates that the strategy distributions of bidders within and without a social network 
should be significantly different. However, it does not receive any support from Figure 3. On average, 
joining a social network does not change the bidding strategy distribution. It means whether joining a 
social network or not does not impose any significant impact on bidding strategy adoption. 
In hypothesis 3, we will investigate one of the determinants proposed by previous study (Granovetter 
2005) to Gini variation. Firstly, we divide 181 social networks into 3 categories according to their size.  
 
Social Network Size Frequency Portion(%) Category 
[2,3] 79 43.65 Small 
(3,10] 70 38.67 Medium 
(10,140] 32 17.68 Large 
Table 9.         Categorized social network by size 
To see how bidding strategy adoption homogeneity changes with social network size (hypothesis 3), 
we test our hypotheses with ANCOVA on Gini versus social network size adjusting for covariate year. 
Figure 4 and Table 10 are the estimated results. 
 
Figure 4. Scatter Plot for ANCOVA 
 
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.1353 0.0204 6.64 <.0001 
Year=2006 0.0718 0.0208 3.44 0.0007 
Year=2007 0.0487 0.0202 2.41 0.0166 
Size=Large 0.0357 0.0198 1.8 0.0727 
Size=Medium 0.0279 0.0158 1.77 0.0785 
Table 10.          Parameter estimates for ANCOVA 
Hypothesis 3 reasons that social network with smaller size is more homogeneous than bigger ones. 
From Table 10, we can notice that, in any year (keeping covariate year fixed), the size of social 
network imposes statistically significant impact on bidding strategy adoption homogeneity: the size of 
social network is positively related to Gini (comparing with the reference group size=Small, the 
estimated results for size=Medium and size=Large are 0.0279 and 0.0357 and both p-values <0.1). It 
indicates that smaller size social network tends to be more homogeneous in strategy adoption. Thus, 
hypothesis 3 is proved. 
To verify hypothesis 4, we group bidders’ role into 3 categories: Bidder Only, Group Leader and 
Member Only. Table 11 is a summary for the relationship between bidding strategy adoption and 
bidders’ roles. 
 
Parameter Bidder Only Member Only Social Network Leader 
All Late 3.9295% 4.8128% 3.7607% 
All Skeptic 3.1407% 2.2626% 3.7159% 
Early Bid 34.2525% 34.7158% 37.6299% 
Evaluator 1.0411% 0.6525% 1.1701% 
Late Bid 57.0070% 56.7258% 53.6224% 
Paticipator 0.6292% 0.8305% 0.1009% 
Table 11.          Role and bidding strategy adoption 
From Table 11, we can find that, among social network leaders, the portions of “All Skeptic”, “Early 
Bid”, and “Evaluator” are much higher than other roles. And strategies “All Late”, “Late Bid” and 
“Participator” are not frequently employed by leader as other roles. 
Hypothesis 4 is about bidder’s role in social network and its potential impact on bidding strategy 
adoption. According to Table 11, we notice that, comparing with roles bidder only and member only, a 
social network leader prefers strategies “All Skeptic”, “Early Bid”, and “Evaluator” to “All Late”, 
“Late Bid” and “Participator”. This can be considered as a supportive evidence for hypothesis 4. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite a vast majority of studies focus on identifying bidding strategy, very little attention has been 
paid to the determinants of bidding strategy adoption. In this study, we focus on the perspective of 
social network and find theory support from the research stream about social influence and human 
behaviour. Several hypotheses are derived from previous theoretical works and are summarized in 
Table 12. Real transactional and relational data from Prosper.com is used to verify those hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Content Theory Verification 
1 Bidding strategy adoption homogeneity 
trend at market level 
Social network homophily 
(McPherson et al. 2001) 
Supported 
2 Bidding strategy adoption distributions 
comparison between social network 
members and non-members 
social network and information 
diffusion 
(Jackson 2009) 
Not supported 
3 The impact of social network size on 
bidding strategy adoption homogeneity 
Social network size and ability to 
crystallize and enforce norms 
(Granovetter 2005) 
Supported 
4 The impact of social network role on 
bidding strategy adoption 
Group leader role in channelling 
information 
(Burt 2000, p. 360; Kotter 1999; 
Whyte 1943/1993) 
Supported 
Table 12.          Summary for hypotheses 
At present, we only focus on the impact of social network on bidding strategy. However, this is not as 
ideal as we preconceived. In order to evaluate the impact of social network on bidding strategy 
adoption more precisely, we will expand our research by introducing more control variables, like 
bidders’ experience and physical locations. More theory analysis will also be included in future work 
to explain the empirical results more thoroughly.  
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